Este trabalho trata da controvert ida questao dos efeitos de po liticas ma croecon6micas antecipadas sabre 0 produto real num regi me de exp�ctativas racionais. Ele mostra que a proposi<;ao de neu tralidade no curto-prazo, derivada pelas novas teorias de equili bria do cicIo economica, e invalidada pela existencia de contratos salariais dessincronizados que pro cur am fixar 0 valor media do sa lario real ao longo do contrato. Estes contratos dessincronizados "de salar io real" dao origem a uma relacao tipo curva de Phillips entre acelera<;ao da infla<;ao e desemprego somente se a meta de sa lario real media par eles estabelecida mover-se contraciclicament� Alem disso, uma inovacao perfeitamente antecipada na politica mone taria tern urn irnpac�o direto sobre a inflacao que naa pade ser cap turado par uma curva de Phillips fixa.
INTRODUCTION
The new equilibrium theories of the business cycle have produced the remarkable result that anticipated macro-policies have no effect on such real aggregates as output or the unemployment rate.
1 It has been shO\\fn recently that this proposition also holds for some keynesian disequilibrium models (see Bennett McCallum and my 1981 paper), but we know that it fails to hold in models with staggered wage cont racts, as shown by Stanley Fischer and John Taylor (1980) .
Since these models provide at the present the best theoretical rationale for policy activism, additional efforts in the direction of sharpening our understanding about them seem to be justified.
This paper deals with staggered labor contracts that are written so as to keep the expected average real wage over the contract span equal to a certain target value. These staggered real wage contracts are a s ort of hybrid of the contracts studied by Stanley Fischer with those studied by E dmund Phelps and John Taylor. They have a real wage target, but otherwise differ from Fischer's contracts in having the nominal wage fixed within each contract, while Fischer assumes that the nominal wage is indexed to future price levels as expected at the time contracts are written, and therefore will not in general be constant within the contract span. In this res pect staggered real wage contracts are similar to Phelps-Taylor's contracts, though the latter assume a relative wage target rather than a real wage target. There is, however, as shown in the Appendix, a perfect equivalence in the analytical consequences of these two types of contracts, and our results can be easily restated in tenus of staggered relative wage contracts.
The paper constructs a simple macroeconomic model for an eco nomy with rational expectations and staggered real wage contracts.
In this model there is scope for policy activismr and the optimal feedback control rule for monetary policy can be deriv ed c) 
which says that at the start of each period the price level is set at the value that minimizes the expected square deviation of output from its natural value.
The endogenous variables in the model are fi t ' P t , Y t , and h t i the stochastic terms I Y I and x t are exogenous. We solve it by first reducing (1), (2) and (3) to:
where Z t is introduced as a short-hand notation for the rate of inflation, Z t = 6P t ' and S t = �t + 0 t" From (5) we find: 4 under the simplifying assumption that E: t is a stationary white noise process with variance O�i hence,
and the first order condition for a minimum in (4) is simply:
Substitution of (7) into (5) gives:
which establishes the neutrality of anticipated money: macroeconomic disequilibrium may result from unanticipated disturbances, including monetary policy shocks (� t )' but the anticipated componento[ money supply growth (x t ) has no effect on the behavior of real output.
It is important to notice that (7) implies: which means that the price level is set at the beginning of each period at the value that will produce macroeconomic equilibrium in the period if no unforreseen event occurs. It is simple to find a solution for (19) when (1-g) is ass umed to be less than unity in absolute value. We substitute (18) and (20) into (5) to get:
which can be expanded backwards into:
or, by letting T go to infinity:
(22) h t = From this last equation, the unconditional expectation and variance of h t can be calculated as:
hence, it follows that:
which attains a mininum with respect to z when z = x. 10
We conclude, therefore, that (21) can be written as:
(24) h t = 11-g)h t _ 1 -c t which is not consistent with neutrality of anticipated monetary policy, as the feedback parameter 9 of the policy rule appears as one of the determinants of the dynamic behavior of the output gap.
Note that, if 9 is positive, a single unanticipated dist urbance will, ceteris paribus, produce a sequence of disequilibra I wi til the sha pe of this disequilibrium path being determined by the feedback para meter of monetary policy. 11 Obviously, an optim al stabilization policy will set this parameter equal to unity, forcing the economy to behave 12 as in the discret8 market clearing case, that is:
THE PHILLIPS CURVE
An unappealing consequence of the model of the previous section is that the rate of inflation is constant over time, as shown by (18), and there is no room for a Phillips Curve relationship between inflation and unemplo_'ment. To avoid this we must assume that the average real wage target in labor contracts moves countercycl i.cally, so that contracts are expected to provide a higher average real wage over their duration, when the unemployment rate is expected to be higher. 13 In the simplest version of this assumption, the nominal contract wage w t for period t is given by:
where Z is a positive constant.
From this we derive the equivalent of (13) as:
and, using (15), we find:
which is the eql'.ivalent of (16) I and can be used to rewrite (26) as: 1 (2 9 ) E t _ 1 2 t + 1 -2 z t + E t _2Z t
= -2 f ( E t _, h t + E t _ 2 h t _ , )
One solution of this last equation is: 14 which implies the Phillips Curve relationship:
or, using the fact that, from (5) (26), from (32) the real wage (w t -p t ) for the first period of contracts will have to be falling over time. This, however, is possible only if the real wage (w t -P t + 1 ) for the second period of cOlltracts is increasing over time, which seems to imply that the rate of inflation must be falling over time (note that l':.(w t -P t+, ) > 0 implies 6P t + l < ll w t ).
Thus, the Phillips Curve exists because, when the output gap is different from zero, changes in the rate of inflation are needed to make the average real wage over workers (1(w t + w t _ 1 ) -P t ) im plied by the contract equation (26) consistent with the fixed average mark-up implicit in (10).
From (30), assuming the same monetary policy rule as before, and using (5) I we obtain:
t which is essentially similar to (21), and also implies that the unconditional expected square deviation of real output natural level is minimized when z '" x. (A proof of this is in Appendix B. ) Hence, it can be rewritten as:
from the assertion As before, an optimal stabilization policy requires setting 9 '" 1, which reduces this last equation to h t '" £ t ' as in the discrete market clearing case (see Appendix B).
POLICY INNOVATIONS
VY'hat is the effect of a fully anticipated change in the monetary policy rule on inflation 'an unemployment? Suppose, for example, that the mone tary policy rule is:
with changes in the target rate of inflation x t being anticipated only at the period immediately before their occurence, that is to say, E t _ 1 X t = x t but E t _ 2 X t = x t _ 1 " How do these fully anticipated policy innovations get reflected on the equations that specify the behavior of the output gap and the inflation rate?
To answer this question we must go back to equation (17) 
) is a solution of (17) when the monetary policy rule is given by (20).
We find the value of z in this case by nothing that from (21) we get the equivalent of (22) as: and since, by definition, the unconditional expectation of policy innovations is zero, that is, E(X t -x t _ 1 ) = 0, it follows that:
which attains a minimum with respect to z when z = o.
Thus , the equivalent of (24) in the present case is: (3) It is usual in the rational expectations literatura to write (1) in terms of log< lrithmic deviations from trend rather than in the present rate of change £orl11. Our execuse for departing from tradition is twofold. First, it seems better to assume that the change in velocity, rather than velocity itself, is a \�hite noise process. since there is no economic justification for a fixed natural velocity level. Second, the use of this rate of change specification greatly simplifies the argument. Note that Thomas Sargent and Neil (.,'a1111c(' have once used a similar formulation.
(4) Using the fact that E t _ 1 Z t of the economy. Z t ' since private agents know the true model (5) Note, however. that discrete market clearing is a sufficient, necessary, condition for neutrality. See my 1981 paper.
but not (6) There are Some problems with the microeconomic rationale of this assumption which are usually sidesteped in the literature. If each half of the labor force is employed by a different set of firms, and each firm sets its price as a fixed mark-up over its nominal wage, n .. lative prices will change whene ver the aggregate price level changes, affecting the distribution of aggre-= gate real demand among firms. A constant rate of inflation, for example, will generate continous real demand shifts among firms.
To avoid this unrealistic implication of (10), we have to assume either that the composite commodities produced by the two sets of firms complementary, or that sectoral demands are functiollS of relative prices, as given, for example, by two period moving price ratios.
are highly "permanent" averages of
As far as I know only George Akerlof has so far made a serious attempt to model explicitly the microeconomics of staggered price setting. (9) Though it will he seen here that (19) has a simple solution when the monetary policy rule is given by (20), it should be noted that there may be no solution for this optimization problem when monetary policy fo11O\"s some other rule. t.Jhen this is the case, we have to replace (19) by the minirniza-lion of some intertemporal disutility functional . See Dimitri Bertsekas for a discussion of the relationship betl.; 'een single stage and sequential deci sion making problems under uncertainty.
(10)This result is also valid when g""O, though the argument in this cnse is and slightly more complicated. Assume there is some period, say t"'O, in which the economy is in equilibrium (hence h O "'O). Instead of (22), Hrite:
if t<0 i =t i::: t derive:
( I (I-g) (z-x» + a I (l-g)-
� . if i",Q i=O E(h;)
-1 i --2 2 -1 (1_g) 2i ,
I
(1-g) (x-z») + a I if i=Q i=t t>O t<O which at.tains a ffiLUlffium with respect to z for all t when z argument: in this paper always aSSUmes that (1-g) is less absolute value, it should be kept in mind that our results Case g=O.
x.
Though the than unity in also apply to the (ll)Hith constant money growth (g=O) a single unanticipated disturbance will, ceteris paribus, produce a permanent state of disequilibrium. This happens because the contract equation (12) makes the inflation rate constat)t over time, as shO\m by (18), and if the rate of growth of money is also constant, the real quantity of money is fixed ,,-nd canot work as a stabilizing feedback control on the uner.1pl·:)yment rate. This paradoxa 1 feature of the model can be eliminated by adding an excess demand term to the contract equation, as we do in the following sect. on, or by adding an excess d0mand term to equation (10), which can be understood then as an aggregate supply function.
(12)This also makes E(h�) o for all t, as shown by (23).
(13)lan McDonald and Robert So10w have shown that such countercyclical movement of the contract real wage can be explained by a model of efficient bargaining in the labor market I"ith sales-constrained firms.
(14)To check this solution, note that E t_2 z t '" Z t for all t, therefore E z -2z + E z = z -z ..!. f (E h E I ) t-l t+l t t-2 t t+l t 2 t-l t l' • t-2 \-1 .
In tilis case the equivalent 01 (29) in the paper is:
and the equivalc!lt of (31) is:
It is clear that this equation qualifies as a well-behaved accclerationist Phillips Curve only if j is nea9a�ivc, in contrast to the assumption by both Phelps and Taylor that this parameter is positive. ThIS means that contracts must be expected to provide a better relative rcal wage when the unemployment rate is expected to be higher.
APPENDIX B
This Appendix derives equation (34) of Section 3 expli dly. Note that� since E t _ 1 h t '" h t + c t ' (33) may be rewritten as:
Consider the following polinomials in the lag operator:
where we assume that ceLl is invertible. Then (B1)
can be written ;lS:
(1-g)h t _ 1
